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[L. A. No. 29607.
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Aug. 5, 1969.]

SOUTHEHN CAI.JIFORNIA ACOUSTICS CO., ·INC., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. C. V. HOLDER, INC., et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
dence

[1] Contracts- Consent-Necessity for Acceptance. ~ Silence in

ryto

the face of an offer is not an acceptance, unless there is a
relationship between the parties or a previous course of
dealing pursuant to which silence would be understood as
acceptance.
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[2] Public Works-Subletting.-'In the absence of an agreement
to the contrary, listing of a subcontractor in a prime bid on a
public improvement project is not an implied acceptance of
the subcontractor's bid by the general contractor, but is in
response to statutory command (Gov. Code, § 4104) and cannot
reasonably be construed as an expression of acceptance.
[3] Estoppel-Equitable Estoppel-Promissory Estoppel.-.There
must be a promise that· was relied on before the rule can be
invoked that a promise which the promisor sh-ould reasonably
expect to induce action or forebearance of a definite and
substantial character on the part of the promisee and which
does induce such aetion or forebearance is binding if. injustice
can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.

[4] Public Works-Substitution .,and Subletting.-The pll1'J>9se of
Gov. Code, § 4107, relating to substitution of subcontracto'ts:cby
the prime contractor on a public improvement contract, is not '
limited to providing the awarding authority with an opportunity to approve substitute contractors, but its purpose is also to
protect the public and subcontract9rs from the evils attendant
upon the practices of bid shopping ( use of a low bid already
received to' pressure other subcontractors into SUbmitting
lower bids) and bid peddling .(an attempt bysubcontrac'tor to
[1] See ·Cal.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 23; Am.Jur.2d, COntracts, § 47.

[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Public Works and Contracts, § 10.
[3] Promissory estoppel, notes, 115 A.L.R. 152, 48 A.L.R.2d
1069. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Rev., Estoppel, § 9; A~.Jur.2d, Estoppel
and \Vaiver, §§ 48, 49

W!IIcK. Dig. References: [1] Contracts, § 20; [2, 4-9] Public
orks, § 10; [3] Estoppel, § 24(7.5).
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undercut kn.own bids already submitted to the general c.ontrac•
. tor) subsequent to the award .of the prime contract f.or a
public facility.
[6] Id.-.Substitution and Subletting.-G.ov. C~de, § 4107, relating
t.o substituti.on .of subcontractors by a prime contract.or .on a
public improvement contract, limits the right .of the prime '
contract.or t.o make substituti.ons and the discreti.on .of the
awarding auth.ority t.o consent t.o· substituti.ons to th.ose situati.ons listed in subdivisi.on (a) .of the statute, all .of which
are keyed to the unwillingness .or inability .of the listed subc.ontractor pr.operly to perf.orm.
[6] Id.-Substitution· and Subletting.-Under G.ov. C.ode, § 410i,
relating to substituti.on .of subc.ontractors by a prime c.ontrae.
t.or .on a pubiic impr.ovement contract, unless a listed sub.
contract.or becomes insolvent or fails .or refuses to perf.onn a
written contract f.or the w.ork .or fails .or refuses to meet tbf
b.ond requirements 'Of the prime contractor, the prime eon ..
tractor may n.ot substitute an.other subc.ontract.or f.or the listed
sub c.ontrac t.or, and the awarding auth.ority may n.ot c.onseJlt
t.o such a substituti.on, until ·the c.ontract is presented t()
\ the listed subc.ontract.or and he, after having had a reason·
able .opportunity t.o d.o s.o, fails .or refuses t.o e~ecute tbt
written c.ontract.
[7] Id.-Substitution and Subletting.-G.ov. Code, § 4107, relating
t.o substituti.on .of subc.ontract.ors by a prime c.ontractor on •
public impr.ovement c.ontract, c.onfers the right .on the listed sub.
c.ontract.or t.o perf.orm the subc.ontract unless statut.ory grounds
f.or a valid substituti.on exist, and the right may be enf.orced by
anacti.on f.or damages against the prime -c.ontractor t.o reeover
the benefit .of the bargain the listed subc.ontract.or w.ould have
realized had he n.ot wr.ongfully been deprived .of the subcontracl
r

[8] Id.-Substitution and Subletting.-There is no 'statutory pr'O"
visi9n f.or the rec.overy .of damages by a subc.ontractor agamst
~ .public entity f.or its c.onsenting t.o a substitution .of nbool;ltractors in vi.olati.on.of G.ov. Code, § 4107.
.
[9] Id.-Substitution and Subletting.-A subcontractor who .-.,
listed in a prime contrac.or's bid .on a public improvemt"nl
project in response to statutory command and n.ot because tbr
contracting parties' purpose was expressly t.o benefit the subc.ontractor, was at m.ost an incidental beneficiary and could D()!
rec.over against the awarding auth.ority f.or breach .of eont~t
as a third-party beneficiary .of the contract between the pnlDe
c.ontractor and the awarding authority.

[71 C.2d
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Clinton Rhodda, Court Commissioner, Judge
pro tern. Affirmed in part and reversed in part with directions.
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Action by a subcontractor against a general contractor and
a school district for damages for breaeh of contract, breach of
8 statutory duty and for :negligence. Judgment of dismissal
after demurrer to second amended complaint was sustained
wit hout leave to amend· affirmed as to school district and
ren~rsed with directions as to general contractor.
~Iunns
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& I{ofiord, Munns, Kofford, Hoffman, Hunt &
Throckmorton, Milton J. Morris, David M. Raatz, Jed L.
Krlson and Gordon Hunt for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Raymond If. Levy as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff
and Appellant.
Grant & Popovich and Irvin Grant for Defendants and
Respondents;
TR.AYNOR, C. J.-Plaintiff appeals from a judgment ()f
dismissal entered after a demurrer
to its second amended
,
complaint was sustained without leave to amend.
Plaintiff alleged that it is a licensed specWty subcontractor. On November 24, 1965, it submitted by telephone to
defendant O. V. Holder, mc., a· general contractor, a subcontract bid in the amount of $83,400 for the furnishing and
installation of acoustical tile on
publie -construction job.
Later that day Holder submitted a bid for the prime contract
to codefendant Los Angeles. Unified School District. As required by law, .Holder listed the subcontractors who would
perform work on the project of a value in excess of one-half of
one percent of the total bid. 1 Holder listed plaintiff as the
-

a

lGO\-ernment Code sectio'n 4104' provides: '~Anyo:ffieer, department,
hou!d or commission taking bids for the construction of any public work
or Improvement shall provide in the specifications prepared for the
or improvement or in the general conditions under which bids will
. r{'('eived for the doing of the work incident to the public work or
l~lpro'\-ement that any person making a bid or offer to perform the work,
• <ill. in his bid or offer, set forth:
H (a)
The name and the location of the place of business of each
IU~I('ontractor who will perform work or labor or render service to the·
"rune contractor in or about the construction of the work or improvement
111 :lll amount in excess of one-half of 1 percent of the prime contractor's
totul Ilid .
.. (b) The portion of the work which will be done by each such sub:~n!ractor under this act. The. prime .contractor shall list. only one sub1• nh·ractor for each such portIon as IS defined by the prlme contractor
11 IS bid. "

:,;rk
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acoustical tile subcontractor. Holder was ~ubsequently
awarded the prime contract for construction of the facility
and executed a written contract with the school district on
Decenlber 9, 1965. A local trade newspaper widely circulated
among subcontractors reported that Holder had been awarded
the contractmld included in its report the names of the subcontractors listed in Holder's bid. Plaintiff read the report
and, acting on the assumption that its bid had been accepted,
refrained from bidding on other construction jObs in order to
remain within its bonding limits.
Sometime between December 27, 1965, and January 10,
1966, Holder requested permission from the school district to
substitute another subcontractor for plaintiff, apparently on
the ground that plaintiff had been inadvertently listed in the
bid in place of the intended subcontractor. The school district
consented, and the substitution was made. Plaintiff then
sought a writ of mandamus to compel the school district to
rescind its consent to the change in subcontracto,rs. The trial
court sustained
the district's demurrer and thereafter
dis' .
.
missed the proceeding. Plaintiff did not appeal. Plaintiff then
. brought this action for damages against Holder and the school
district.
Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in sustaining
the demurrer :on the' ground that the facts alleged in its complaint would support recovery of damages for breach of eontract, breach of a statutory duty, and for negligenc·e: We conclude that plaintiff has stated a caus~ of action for breach of a
- --~-. . statutory duty.
There was no contract between plaintiff and Holder, for
Holder did not accept plaintiff's offer. [1]· Silen.ce in the
face of an offer iSJ.lot an acceptance, unless there is a relationship between the parties or a previous course of dealing pur-.
suan t to which silence would be understood as acceptance.
(See Wold v. League of the Cross (1931) 114 Cal.App. 414.
479-481 [300 P. 57] ; lVood v. Gunther (1949,) 89 Cal.App.2d
718, 730-731 [201 P.2d 874] ; 1 'Villiston on COntracts (3d ed.
1957) §§ 91-91A; 1 V\Titkiu, Summary of Cal. Law (7th ed.
1960) Contracts, § 60, pp. 65-67.) No such relationship or
course of dealing is alleg£d. Nor did Holder accept the bid by
using it in presenting its own bid. [2] In the absence of aD
agreement to the contrary, listing of the subcontractor in ~f!
prime bid is not an implied acceptance of the subcontracto
bid by the general contractor. (Klose v. S,equoia Unio-n elg

!:
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School Dist. (1953) 118 Ca.l.App.2d 636, 641 [258 P.2d 515] ;
Sore ross v. Winters (1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 207, 217 [25 Cal.
Rptr. 821]. See Williams v. Favret (1947) 161 F.2d 822; 1
Corbin on Contracts (1963) § 24 and fn. 11 at pp. 72-73. ) The
listing by the general contractor of the subcontractors, he
intends to retain is in response to statutory command (ffi>v.
Code, § 4104) and cannot reasonably be construed as an expression of acceptance. (Cf. Western Concrete Structures Co.
'". James I. Barnes Constr. Co. (1962) 206 Cal ..App.2d 1, 13
[23 Cal.Rptr. 506]; Klose v. Sequoia Union High School
Dist., supra, 118 Cal.App.2d 636,641.)
,
[3] Plaintiff contends, however, that its reliance on
Holder's use of its bid and Holder's failure to, reject its offer
promptly after Holder's bid was accepted constitute acceptance of plaintiff's bid by operation of law under the doctrine
of promissory estoppel. Section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts states: "A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and
sUb;tantial character on the part Qf the promisee and which'
does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice
can be avoided only by enforce&ment of the promise." This
rule applies in this state. (Drennan v. Star Paving Co. (1958)
51 Cal2d 409, 413 [333P.2d 757].) Before it can be invoked,
howeyer, there must be a promise that was relied upon. (Bard
. Y. Kent (1942) 19 Ca1.2d 449, 453 [122 P.2d 8, 139 A.L.R.
1032] ; Hilltop Properties, Inc. v. State of California (1965)
233 Cal.App.2d 349, 364 [43 Cal. Rptr. 605] ; lA Corbin on
Contracts (1963) § 200, p. 218.)
.
In Drennan, we held that implicit in the subcontractor's
bid was a subsidiary promise to keep his bid open for a rea8:mable time after award of the prime contract to give the
general contractor an opportunity to accept the offer on which
he relied in computing the prime' bid. The subsidiary promise
Was implied "to preclude the ihJustice that would result if
Ule offer could be revoked after the offeree had acted in detriInental reliance thereon." (51 Ca1.2d at p. 414.)
Plaintiff urges us to find an analogous subsidiary promise
llot t.o reject its bid in this case, but it fails to allege facts
ShOWing the existence of any promise by Holder to it· upon
which it detrimentally relied .. Plaintiff did not rely on any
promise by Holder, but only on the listing of subcontrac,tors
required by section 4104 of the Government O>de and on the
statutory restriction on Holder's right to change its list,ed
subcontractors without the consent of the school district.
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(Gov. Code, § 4107.) Holder neither aecepted plaintiff's offe:
.nor made any promise or offer to plaintiff intended to "indue
action or forbearance of a definite and substantial charaetel

"

Plaintiff contends, however, tllat the Subletting and Sui
contracting Fair Practices Act2 confers rights on listed sui
contractors that arise when the prime c.ontract is awarded an~
that these rights may be enforced by an action for dam~
Before that act was adopted in 1963, it was settled that th
Government Code sections governing subcontracting, whicl
the act superseded, conferred no .rightson subcontracton;
(Klose v.Sequoia Union H·igh School Dist., supra, 118 Cal
App.~d 636, 641.) Klose was- a proceeding in mandate br.oughi
by a taxpayer against the awarding authority to compel the
latt~r to assess a penalty against a prime contractor. ThE
prime contractor had changed subcontrac.tors with the consen1
.of the awarding authority .on the gr.ound that the original
listing had been the result .of error. The plaintiff contendoo
that under the language of then Governmen,t Code section
4104, subdivision (d)3 an awarding authority had no legal
power to consent to the change on the ground stated and that
the substitution was therefore in violation of the statuia Such
a violation would render the prinle contractor liable for penalties provided for by then section 4106. (Now § 4110.)
The court denied relief on the ground that the language of
subdivision (d) of section 4104 that auth.orizedthe substitu-.
tion of another for. a subcontractor who failed to execute a
........ 2Stats. 1963, ch. 2125, pp. 4410-4414,amending and renumberingaee-tions 4100-4108 of the Government Code. These sections of the GOl'erllment Code set out requirements for listing of subcontractors in the prUDe
bid and for all<;>wable substitutions of listed subcontractors.
3Prior to the 1963 act, section 4104 provided:
'.
I' N Q general contractor whose bid is accepted' shall, without the ~.
sent of the a.warding authority, e i t h e r : ·
.
I I (a) Substitute any personas subcontractor in place of the subeolttractor designated in the original bid.
.
I I (b) Permit any such subcontract to be assigned or transferred .,
allow it to be performed by anyone other than the original subconuaeiOf
listed in the bid.
.
,t (c) . Sublet or subcontract any portion .of the work in excess of. oat"
half (IA!) of one per cent (1%) of the general contractor's total bId ..
to which his original bid did not designate a subcontractor.
. . . ..r
" (d) The awarding authority may consent to the subshtutl~1l ...
allother person as a subcontractor, when the subcontractor !lamed
bid after haying had a reasonable opportunity to do so, falls or re tk'
to execute a written contract, when said written contract, based upo~ i»'
general terms, conditions, plans and specifications for the proJe:ed ...
volved, or t.he terms of such subcontractor's written bid, is prescn
.
him by the contractor."
-

l;.!-

[71 C.2d
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written contract did not limit the awarding authority's discretion to consent to the substitution of subcontractors in
otJwr situations. In so concluding the court listed a series of
situations in which substitutions not provided for by subdivision (d) would be necessary to the efficient execution of a
pub) ic project. 4 The court also concluded that the purpose of
tht' listing and substitution sections was not to grant rights to
listed subcontractors, but to provide an opportunity to the
awarding authority to investigate and a.pprove the initial subcontractors and any proposed substitutions.
The amendments made by the 1963 Subletting and SubcontTll('t.ing Fair Practices Act stated the purposes of the statute
in a preamble (§ 4101) 5 and completely revised the section
dE'aling with substitution of subContractors, renumbering it
s('Ction 4107. 6 [4] The purpose, of the amended statute is
4R('ferring to the plaintiff's construction of section 4104 the court
stated: "Such a construction, limiting the right. of the awarding authority to authorize a substitution to the one situation where the original
..uhe.o~tractor refuses tp execute a written contract, would create a completely unworkable system. It would mean that once a general contract
bad been accepted by the awarding authority, no substitution of a sub("ontractor could be made against his will, even though such subcontractor
refused to complete the wor!t, or neglected or was unable to handle the
job, went out of business or into bankruptcy, or even died." (118 Cal.
App.2d at pp. 639-640.)
61 'The Legislature' finds that the practices of bid shopping and bid
peddling in connection. with the construction, alteration, and repair of
llublic improvements often result in poor quality of material and workmanship to the detriment of the public, deprive the public of the full
hcnefits of fair competition among prime contractors and subcontractors,
~ld lead to insolvencies, loss of wages to empl~yees, and other evils. "
(Gov. Code, § 4101.)
61' No prime contractor whose bid is accepted shall:
"(a) Substitute any person as subcontractor in place of the sub('ontractor listed in the original bid, except that the awarding authority
may consent to the substitution of another-per.,son as a subcontractor,
"'hen the subcontractor listed in the bid after having had a reasonable
opportunity to do so fails or refuses to execute a written contract, when
Bueh written eo..~tra.et, based upon the general terms, conditions, plans
and specifications for the project involved or the terms of such' sub('ontractor's written bid, is presented to-him by the prime contractor, or
Lt'comes insolvent or fails or refuses to perform a written contract for
the work or fails or refuses to meet the bond requirements of the prime
('ontractor as set forth in Section 4108. Prior to approval of any such
"uhstitution the awarding authority shall give notice in writing of at
!t'ast three working days to the listed subcontractor of the prime contrador's request to substitute another subcontractor :unless such listed
;Ui.t0utractor has himself advised the awarding authority in writing that
It' has knowledge of the prime contractor's request. Such notiee may be
t-"r\'ed by registered mail to the last known address of such subcontractor.
f ., (b) Permit any such subcontract to -be "VoluntarilY'assigiled or trans''rted or allow it to be performed by anyone other than the original
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not limited, as Klose had concluded with respect to the prior
statute, to providing the awarding authority with an opportunity to approye substitute subcontractors. Its purpose is
also to protect the public and subcontractors from the evils
attendant upon the practices of bid shopping and bid peddling subsequent to the award of the prime contract for a
public facility.7 [5] Thus section 4107 now clearly limits
the right of the prime contractor to make substitutions and
the discretion of the awarding authority to consent t.o substi.
tutions to those situations listed in subdivision (a), all of
which are keyed to the unwillingness or inability of the listed
subcontractor properly to perform. 8 [6] Unless a listed
subcontractor" becomes insolvent or fails or refuses to perform a written contract for the work or fails or refuses to
meet the bond requirements of the prime contractor," the
prime contractor may not substitute another subcontractor for
the listed subcontractor and the awarding authority may not
consent to such a substitution until the contract is presented
to the listed subcontractor and he, after having had a reasonsubcontractor listed in the original bid, without the consent of the award·
ing authority.
" (c) Other than in the performance of 'change orders' causing
changes or deviations from the original contract, sublet or subcontrartany portion of the work in excess of one-half of 1 percent of the prime"
contractor's total bids as to which his original bid did not designate a
subcontractor." (Gov. Code, § 4107.)
7Bid shopping is the use of the low bid already received by the gent-raJ
contractor to pressure other subcontractors into sUbmitting even ]01\'1"r
bids. Bid peddling, conversely, is an attempt by a subcontractor to undt"f·
-cut known bids already submitted to the general eontractorin ordcTlo
procure the job. (See Schueller, Bid Depositories (1960) 58 l\:t:ich.L.Rt'1'.
497,498, fn. 6; Note (1967) 53 Va.L.Rev. 1720, 1724.) The statute it
designed to prevent only bid shopping and peddling that takes place aftt'r
the award of the prime contract. The underlying reasons are clear. Su~
quent to the award of the prime contract at a set price, the prime ~Jl'
tractor may seek to drive down his own cost, and concomitantly inerea~
his profit, by soliciting bids lo,,,,cr than those used in computing b"
prime bid. When successful this practice places a profit squeeze ~n sub·
contractors, impairing their incentive and ability to perform to theIr l.-st.
and possibly precipitating bankruptcy in a weak subcontracting fi!,,",'
<See Gov. Code, § 4101; Note, supra, 53 Va.L.Rev. 1720, 1724; Rt.n'
Constr. Corp. (194i) 8 T.C. 1070, 1076.) Bid peddling and shopping pn~r
to the award of the prime contract foster the same evils, but at least hJ.'r
the effect of passing the reduced costs on to the public in the forPl (k
lower prime contract bids.
8It is significant that the amended statute allows for substitutiol1 (If
subcontractors in all those situations listed hy the c,ourt in Elos(' ~t
necessary to efficient construction of pub1ic faciUties. (See fns. 4 and t "
supra.) Accor~ingb;, there is no basis for construing the 1?r~~ent s(tn;u .~i
as the court 111 Klose felt compelled to construe subdlYlSlOll n t~
. t"1011 on li('
former section 4104, to confer "plenary power of subshtu
nwarding authority." (118 Cal.App.2d at p. 639.)

I

I [71 C.2d

I~he

ay not
resented
. reason-

, causing
bcontract
he prime
signate a
Ie general
~en lower
ito under'order 10
Ich.L.Re\'.
statute is
lace after
Ir. Subserime con. increase
llting his
? on sub·
heir best~
ing firm.
~4; Ring
ing prior
east ha\'('
form of
~utio" of

rno. )8

4 8I1\1 tl.
; statute,
(a) ()(

on

SOUTHERN CAL. ACOUSTICS CO. V.
C. V. HOLDER, INC.

727

[71 C.2d 719; 79 Cal.Rptr. 319, 456 P.2d 975]

'jior
n oppor.
rpose is
the evils
bid ped.
ct for a
ly limits
ions and
.0 substi.
, all of
he listed
a listed

1

Aug. 1969]

tllt'

able opportunity to do so, fails or refuses to execute the written eontract. Accordingly, under the facts as pleaded in this
ease. Holder had no right to substitute another subcontractor
in place of plaintiff, and the school district had no right to
('onsent to that substitution.
[7] Since the purpose of the statute is to proteet both the
public and subcontractors from the evils of the proscribed
unfair bid peddling and bid shopping (GDv. Code, §§ 4100,
4101), we hold that it confers the right on the listed suooontrdCior to perform the subcontract unless statuto!'Y grounds
for a valid substitution exi~t. Moreover, that right may be
enforced by an action for damages against the prime contractor t.o recover the benefit of the bargain the listed subcontractor would have realized had he not wrongfully been deprived
of the subcontract. (SeeB.ermite Powder Co. v. Franchise Tax
Board (1952) 38 Ca1.2d 700, 703 [242, P.2d 9] ; PaxtOn v.
Paxton (1907) 150 Cal. 667, 670 [89 P. 1083]; Civ. Code,
§ 3523.) Accordingly, plaintiff has stated a cause of action
against defendant Holder for br~ach of section 4107. 9
[8] The question remains whether plaintiff' has stated a
cause of action against the school district. Since there is no
statutory provision for the recovery of damages against a, public entity for its consenting to a substitution of subContract.ors
in yiolation of section 4107, the school district is not liable for
such violation. (Gov. Code, § 815.) [9] Plaintiff contends,
however, that it was a third-party beneficiary of the contract
between Holder and the school district and that therefQre it
mny reeover against the school district for breach of contract.
(See Gov. Code, § 814.) There is no merit in this contention.
Plaintiff was listed in response to statutory command and not
because the contracting parties' purpose was expressly to
IIIn addition to seeking recovery of its anticipated profits of $15,000,
p!aintiff in a separate Cause of action, seeks to recover his expenses of
t~1I0 "in preparation and planning to perform the contract" on the
theory that its incurring of those expenses was caused by Holder's negligeUt'e in listing plaintiff as a subcontractor. We find no basis under the
f:l(·ts pleaded for a separate cause of action for negligence. After plaintiff learned, however, that it had been listed as a subcontractor in a prime
('ontract av..arded to Holder, it was entitled to assume that it would be
?ff('red the subcontract as required by section 4107 until Holder notified
It o.f the intended substitution. Expenses reasonably incurred during this
11(·tlOd may be recovered in addition to plaintiff's anticipated profits in
~r?t't to give it the benefit of the bargain to which it was entitled.
,Gollaher v. Midwood Constr. Co. (1961) 194 Cal.App.2d 640, 649 [15
t( ~l.Hptr. 292] ; Rest., Contracts, § 346, com. g; 11 Williston on Contracts
3d ed. 1968) § 1363.)
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benefit it. Accordingly, plaintiff was at most an incidental
beneficiary and therefore cannot recover as a third-party beneficiary of the contraCt between Holder and the school district.
(Civ.· Code, § 1559; West v. Guy F. Atkinson Constr. Co.
(1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 296, 302 [59 Cal. Rptr. 286] ; Southern
Cal. Gas Co. v. ABC Constr. Co. (1962) 204 Cal.App.2d 747,
751-752 [22 Cal.Rptr. 540].)
The judgment of dismissal as to defendant school district is
.affirmed. The judgment of dismissal as to defendant Holder is
reversed with directions to the trial court to overrule the
demurrer as to defendant Holder and allow it to answer.
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J.,
and Sullivan, J., concurred.
.
Respondents' petition for a rehearing
4,1969.

[L. A. No. 29621.

In Bank.

was,~enied

September

Aug. 5, 1969.]

DOROTHY BILLINGTON,Plaintiff and Appellant, v.
INTERINSURANCE EXCHANGE OF SOUTHERN.
CALIFORNIA, 'Defendant and Respondent.*
[1] Pleading-Answer-Sufficiency: .Appeal-Reserving .QuestioDl
Below-Defenses.-.On appeal by plaintiff judgment creditor,
injured in an automo,bile accident, from a judgment in faror
ofd.efendant insurer in an action to collect theliabilitylimit--on the, judgment debtor's automobile policy, such judgment
being based on the judgment debtor's violation of his' eon..
tracted duty to cooperate in the initial action, plaintiff coula
not successfully Urge defendant's inability to rely on neh
defense~ as not having been affirmatively pleaded in~ef~a.
ant's answer, where the answer had in fact disclaimed 11abihtJ

McK. Dig. References: [1] Pleading, § 115; Appeal and Enor,

§ 158; Insurance, § 335(3); [2] Insurance, § 335(3); [3,5] Insur...
ance, §335(7); [4, 7, 9, 14, 16, 17] Insurance, §334(3); [6)
Automobiles and Other Road Vehicles, § 144(7); [8] Insurantf'~
§ 335(6) ;' [10, 11] Automobiles and Other Road Vehicles, § 72.1 i
[12] Automobiles and Other Road Vehicles, §68(3); InsuranH'J
§ 334(3); [13] Automobiles and Other Road Vehicles, § 68(3);
[15] Insurance, §§ 34,334(3); [18] Insurance, § 335(1).
*Defendant '8 correct name is Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club of Southern California.

